Baruch Spinoza Zitate

seite 2

Ethik, Buch III, "Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte", Lehrsatz 48
Original lat.: "Nam modestia species est ambitionis."
Ethik, Buch III, Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte

Ethik, Buch III, "Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte", Vorwort
Original lat.: "Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui."
Ethik, Buch III, Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte

Ethik, Buch II, "Über die Natur und den Ursprung des Geistes", Lehrsatz 13, Axiom 1
Original lat.: "Omnia corpora vel moventur vel quiescunt."
Ethik, Buch II, Über die Natur und den Ursprung des Geistes

, Buch II, "Über die Natur und den Ursprung des Geistes", Lehrsatz 30
Original lat.: "Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus."
Ethik, Buch II, Über die Natur und den Ursprung des Geistes

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 71
Original lat.: "Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 67
Original lat.: "Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 49
Original lat.: "Existimatio facile hominem qui existimatur superbum reddit."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Tractatus Theologico Politicus, Buch I, Caput I
Original lat.: "Prophetia sive Revelatio est alicujus certa cognitio a Deo hominibus revelata."
Tractatus Theologico Politicus, Buch I

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 69
Original lat.: "Hominis liberi virtus æque magna cernitur in declinandis quam in superandis periculis."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Buch III, "Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte", Definition der Affekte 10
Original lat.: "Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur."
Ethik, Buch III, Über den Ursprung und die Natur der Affekte

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 53
Original lat.: "Humilitas virtus non est sive ex ratione non oritur."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Buch IV, "Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte", Lehrsatz 42
Original lat.: "Hilaritas excessum habere nequit sed semper bona est et contra melancholia semper mala."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Vierter Teil, Über die menschliche Unfreiheit, oder die Macht der Affekte, Erster Lehrsatz, www.zeno.org http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Spinoza,+Baruch+de/Ethik/4.+%C3%9Cber+die+menschliche+Unfreiheit,+oder+die+Macht+der+Affekte
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

Ethik, Buch V, "Über die Macht des Verstandes oder die menschliche Freiheit", Lehrsatz 39
Original lat.: "Id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitæ spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus."
Ethik, Buch V, Über die Macht des Verstandes oder die menschliche Freiheit

Ethik, Buch IV, 21. Lehrsatz
Original lat.: "Nemo potest cupere beatum esse, bene agere et bene vivere, qui simul non cupiat esse, agere et viverem hoc est actu existere."
Ethik, Buch IV, Über die menschliche Knechtschaft oder die Macht der Affekte

zugeschrieben von Friedrich Engels, "Anti-Dühring", Kap. IX

Tractatus Politicus, cap. 5 § 2 books.google http://books.google.de/books?id=bSMAPwr5TekC&pg=PA63&dq=geboren
Original lat.: "Homines enim civiles non nascuntur, sed fiunt." - books.google http://books.google.de/books?id=bSMAPwr5TekC&pg=PA62&dq=civiles
Tractatus Politicus

(Original lat.:“Sed omnia praeclara tam dificilia quam rara sunt.” – Ethica, Pars quinta, in fine
Ethik, Buch V, Über die Macht des Verstandes oder die menschliche Freiheit

bei Richard Mayr: Die philosophische Geschichtsauffassung der Neuzeit (1877), S. 173 archive.org https://archive.org/stream/diephilosophisc00mayrgoog#page/n191/mode/2up; vgl. auch Übersetzung Berthold Auerbach (1841) S. 68 books.google https://books.google.de/books?id=ix4tv6MzT6sC&pg=PA68, gutenberg.spiegel.de http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/ethik-5217/4
Original lat.: "Et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt, donec ad Dei voluntantem, hoc est ignorantiae asylum, confugeris." - Ethica - Pars prima, Appendix
Ethik, Buch I, Von Gott

http://www.zeno.org/nid/20009166122 zeno.org] und Karl Vorländer [http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/-2429/9 gutenberg.spiegel.de
Ethik, Buch I, Von Gott

Bill Kuhns, on the dangers to Spinoza and others, of citing Giordano Bruno as an influence, after his execution as a heretic, in "Giordano Bruno and Marshall McLuhan" in McLuhan Studies Issue 2 (1996) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/mcluhan-studies/v1_iss2/1_2art5.htm
Kontext: Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Bruno's ideas were widely imparted, borrowed, sounded; almost never, though, with the name Giordano Bruno attached to them. Kepler once chided Galileo for omitting his debt to Bruno; yet, we can discern Kepler's own indifference … Later generations would evoke Bruno's writings to the phrase, without quoting or acknowledging him. Recent scholarship on Spinoza, for example, cites Bruno's powerful exertion on his thought about infinity and on his style. Never does Spinoza cite Bruno by name.

Letter to Hugo Boxel (Oct. 1674) The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza (1891) Tr. R. H. M. Elwes, Vol. 2, Letter 58 (54).
Kontext: If I had as clear an idea of ghosts, as I have of a triangle or a circle, I should not in the least hesitate to affirm that they had been created by God; but as the idea I possess of them is just like the ideas, which my imagination forms of harpies, gryphons, hydras, &c., I cannot consider them as anything but dreams, which differ from God as totally as that which is not differs from that which is.<!--pp. 382-383

Letter to Hugo Boxel (Oct. 1674) The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza https://books.google.com/books?id=Nz1kRKDMbUMC (1891) Tr. R. H. M. Elwes, Vol. 2, Letter 58 (54).
Kontext: This impels me, before going into your reasons, to set forth briefly my opinion on the question, whether the world was made by chance. But I answer, that as it is clear that chance and necessity are two contraries, so is it also clear, that he, who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature, must utterly deny that the world has been made by chance; whereas, he who affirms that God need not have made the world, confirms, though in different language, the doctrine that it has been made by chance; inasmuch as he maintains that it proceeds from a wish, which might never have been formed. However, as this opinion and theory is on the face of it absurd, it is commonly very unanimously admitted, that God's will is eternal, and has never been indifferent; hence... the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature. Let them call it will, understanding, or any name they like, they come at last to the same conclusion, that under different names they are expressing one and the same thing. If you ask them, whether the divine will does not differ from the human, they answer, that the former has nothing in common with the latter except its name; especially as they generally admit that God's will, understanding, intellect, essence, and nature are all identical; so I... lest I... confound the divine nature with the human, do not assign to God human attributes, such as will, understanding, attention, hearing, &c. I therefore say, as I have said already, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature, and that it has not been made by chance. I think this is enough to persuade you, that the opinion of those (if such there be) who say that the world has been made by chance, is entirely contrary to mine; and relying on this hypothesis, I proceed to examine those reasons which lead you to infer the existence of all kinds of ghosts.<!--pp. 381-382

Ernest Renan, at the dedication of a statue to Spinoza in 1882, as quoted in The Story of Philosophy (1962) http://caute.net.ru/spinoza/aln/durant.htm by Will Durant
Kontext: Woe to him who in passing should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head. He would be punished, as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to conceive what is divine. This man, from his granite pedestal, will point out to all men the way of blessedness which he found; and ages hence, the cultivated traveler, passing by this spot, will say in his heart, "The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here."

Letter 21 (73) to Henry Oldenburg , November (1675) http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1711&chapter=144137&layout=html&Itemid=27
Kontext: My opinion concerning God differs widely from that which is ordinarily defended by modern Christians. For I hold that God is of all things the cause immanent, as the phrase is, not transient. I say that all things are in God and move in God, thus agreeing with Paul, and, perhaps, with all the ancient philosophers, though the phraseology may be different; I will even venture to affirm that I agree with all the ancient Hebrews, in so far as one may judge from their traditions, though these are in many ways corrupted. The supposition of some, that I endeavour to prove in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus the unity of God and Nature (meaning by the latter a certain mass or corporeal matter), is wholly erroneous.
As regards miracles, I am of opinion that the revelation of God can only be established by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles, or in other words by ignorance.

Friedrich Nietzsche, in a postcard to Franz Overbeck, Sils-Maria (30 July 1881) as translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche (1954)
Kontext: I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza : that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by "instinct". Not only is his overtendency like mine — namely, to make all knowledge the most powerful affect — but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters : he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world-order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergencies are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science. In summa: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and make my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness. Strange!

Bill Kuhns, on the dangers to Spinoza and others, of citing Giordano Bruno as an influence, after his execution as a heretic, in "Giordano Bruno and Marshall McLuhan" in McLuhan Studies Issue 2 (1996) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/mcluhan-studies/v1_iss2/1_2art5.htm
Kontext: Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Bruno's ideas were widely imparted, borrowed, sounded; almost never, though, with the name Giordano Bruno attached to them. Kepler once chided Galileo for omitting his debt to Bruno; yet, we can discern Kepler's own indifference … Later generations would evoke Bruno's writings to the phrase, without quoting or acknowledging him. Recent scholarship on Spinoza, for example, cites Bruno's powerful exertion on his thought about infinity and on his style. Never does Spinoza cite Bruno by name.

Letter to Hugo Boxel (Oct. 1674) The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza (1891) Tr. R. H. M. Elwes, Vol. 2, Letter 58 (54).
Kontext: Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object beheld, as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, or if our constitution were different, what now appears beautiful to us would seem misshapen, and what we now think misshapen we should regard as beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to God, are neither ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that God has created the world, so that it might be beautiful, is bound to adopt one of the two alternatives, either that God created the world for the sake of men's pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created men's pleasure and eyesight for the sake of the world. Now, whether we adopt the former or the latter of these views, how God could have furthered His object by the creation of ghosts, I cannot see. Perfection and imperfection are names which do not differ much from the names beauty and ugliness.<!--p. 382

Quelle: Political Treatise (1677), Ch. 2, Of Natural Right
Kontext: Nature offers nothing that can be called this man's rather than another's; but, under nature, everything belongs to all — that is, they have authority to claim it for themselves. But, under dominion, where it is by common law determined what belongs to this man, and what to that, he is called just who has a constant will to render to every man his own, but he, unjust who strives, on the contrary, to make his own that which belongs to another.

Quelle: Political Treatise (1677), Ch. 6, On Monarchy
Kontext: If slavery, barbarism and desolation are to be called peace, men can have no worse misfortune. No doubt there are usually more and sharper quarrels between parents and children, than between masters and slaves; yet it advances not the art of household management to change a father's right into a right of property, and count children but as slaves. Slavery, then, and not peace, is furthered by handing the whole authority to one man.

Ernest Renan, at the dedication of a statue to Spinoza in 1882, as quoted in The Story of Philosophy (1962) http://caute.net.ru/spinoza/aln/durant.htm by Will Durant
Kontext: Woe to him who in passing should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head. He would be punished, as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to conceive what is divine. This man, from his granite pedestal, will point out to all men the way of blessedness which he found; and ages hence, the cultivated traveler, passing by this spot, will say in his heart, "The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here."

He felt that the Divine Excellence had its abode in the very heart of Nature and within his own body and spirit. Indwelling in every dewdrop as in the innumerable host of heaven, in the humblest flower and in the mind of man, he found the living spirit of God, setting forth the Divine glory, making the Divine perfection and inspiring with the Divine love.

William Boulting, in Giordano Bruno: His Life, Thought, and Martyrdom (1916) online excerpt http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Bruno's%20Eroici.htm
A - F

Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic (2006)
Kontext: Like Socrates, Spinoza avers that blessedness comes only from a certain kind of knowledge—specifically, the "knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature."
... the life of contemplation is also a life within a certain type of community—specifically, a fellowship of the mind. Like Socrates with his circle of debating partners, or Epicurus in his garden with his intellectual companions, Spinoza imagines a philosophical future... upon achieving blessedness for himself, he announces in his first treatise, his first step is "to form a society... so that as many as possible may attain it as easily and as surely as possible." For, "the highest good," he claims, is to achieve salvation together with other individuals "if possible."

Albert Einstein, in The World as I See It (1949) http://books.google.com/books?id=ZpdlRg2IJUcC&pg=PT32&dq=%22en+like+Democritus,+Francis+of+Assisi,+and+Spinoza+are+closely+akin+to+one+another%22&hl=en&ei=-J7LTqqNJaG90AHAir0E&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CGYQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=%22en%20like%20Democritus%2C%20Francis%20of%20Assisi%2C%20and%20Spinoza%20are%20closely%20akin%20to%20one%20another%22&f=false
Kontext: The religious geniuses of all ages have been distinguished by this kind of religious feeling, which knows no dogma and no God conceived in man's image; so that there can be no church whose central teachings are based on it. Hence it is precisely among the heretics of every age that we find men who were filled with this highest kind of religious feeling and were in many cases regarded by their contemporaries as atheists, sometimes also as saints. Looked at in this light, men like Democritus, Francis of Assisi, and Spinoza are closely akin to one another.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, letter to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels (Aug. 14, 1683) in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (1923-) II.ii. p. 535, as translated by Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic (2006) pp. 228-229.
Kontext: Regarding Spinoza, whom M. Arnauld has called the most impious and most dangerous man of this century, he was truly an Atheist, [i. e., ] he allowed absolutely no Providence dispensing rewards and punishments according to justice.... The God he puts on parade is not like ours; he has no intellect or will.... He fell well short of mastering the art of demonstration; he had only a mediocre knowledge of analysis and geometry; what he knew best was to make lenses for microscopes.

Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic (2006)
Kontext: For Spinoza, philosophy originates in the very personal... feeling of emptiness that in the philosophical tradition has earned the distinguished name of contemptu mundi, the contempt for worldly things, or, better, vanitas.... Spinoza says that... success in life is just a postponement of failure;... pleasure is just a fleeting respite from pain; and... the objects of our striving are vain illusions....
The feeling of vanitas Spinoza describes is... a dire encounter with the prospect of descent into absolute nothingness, a life without significance coming to a meaningless end.... The experience Spinoza records... establishes... the moment of extreme doubt, fear, and uncertainty that precedes the dawn of revelation.... the journey... is one trodden by poets, philosophers, and theologians too numerous to mention, who for millennia have recorded this feeling that life is a useless passion, a wheel of ceaseless striving, a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, and so on.<!--pp. 55-56

Friedrich Nietzsche, in a postcard to Franz Overbeck, Sils-Maria (30 July 1881) as translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche (1954)
Kontext: I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza : that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by "instinct". Not only is his overtendency like mine — namely, to make all knowledge the most powerful affect — but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters : he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world-order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergencies are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science. In summa: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and make my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness. Strange!

such as the laying down, interpretation, and abrogation of laws, the fortification of cities, deciding on war and peace, &c. But if this charge belong to a council, composed of the general multitude, then the dominion is called a democracy; if the council be composed of certain chosen persons, then it is an aristocracy ; and, if, lastly, the care of affairs of state, and, consequently, the dominion rest with one man, then it has the name of monarchy.
Quelle: Political Treatise (1677), Ch. 2, Of Natural Right

Erich Fromm, in The Sane Society (1955), Ch. 2: Can A Society be Sick?—The Pathology of Normalcy
Kontext: Spinoza formulated the problem of the socially patterned defect very clearly. He says: "Many people are seized by one and the same affect with great consistency. All his senses are so strongly affected by one object that he believes this object to be present even if it is not. If this happens while the person is awake, the person is believed to be insane. … But if the greedy person thinks only of money and possessions, the ambitious one only of fame, one does not think of them as being insane, but only as annoying; generally one has contempt for them. But factually greediness, ambition, and so forth are forms of insanity, although usually one does not think of them as 'illness.'" These words were written a few hundred years ago; they still hold true, although the defects have been culturally patterned to such an extent now that they are not even generally thought any more to be annoying or contemptible.

Quelle: Political Treatise (1677), Ch. 6, On Monarchy
Kontext: If slavery, barbarism and desolation are to be called peace, men can have no worse misfortune. No doubt there are usually more and sharper quarrels between parents and children, than between masters and slaves; yet it advances not the art of household management to change a father's right into a right of property, and count children but as slaves. Slavery, then, and not peace, is furthered by handing the whole authority to one man.

Kontext: For Spinoza, philosophy originates in the very personal... feeling of emptiness that in the philosophical tradition has earned the distinguished name of contemptu mundi, the contempt for worldly things, or, better, vanitas.... Spinoza says that... success in life is just a postponement of failure;... pleasure is just a fleeting respite from pain; and... the objects of our striving are vain illusions....
The feeling of vanitas Spinoza describes is... a dire encounter with the prospect of descent into absolute nothingness, a life without significance coming to a meaningless end.... The experience Spinoza records... establishes... the moment of extreme doubt, fear, and uncertainty that precedes the dawn of revelation.... the journey... is one trodden by poets, philosophers, and theologians too numerous to mention, who for millennia have recorded this feeling that life is a useless passion, a wheel of ceaseless striving, a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, and so on.<!--pp. 55-56

Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic (2006)

Letter 74 (76) to Albert Burgh (1675) http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1711&chapter=144250&layout=html&Itemid=27
Kontext: You seem to wish to employ reason, and ask me, "How I know that my philosophy is the best among all that have ever been taught in the world, or are being taught, or ever will be taught?" a question which I might with much greater right ask you; for I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, I know that I understand the true philosophy. If you ask in what way I know it, I answer: In the same way as you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: that this is sufficient, will be denied by no one whose brain is sound, and who does not go dreaming of evil spirits inspiring us with false ideas like the true. For the truth is the index of itself and of what is false.
But you, who presume that you have at last found the best religion, or rather the best men, on whom you have pinned your credulity, you, "who know that they are the best among all who have taught, do now teach, or shall in future teach other religions. Have you examined all religions, ancient as well as modern, taught here and in India and everywhere throughout the world? And, if you, have duly examined them, how do you know that you have chosen the best" since you can give no reason for the faith that is in you? But you will say, that you acquiesce in the inward testimony of the Spirit of God, while the rest of mankind are ensnared and deceived by the prince of evil spirits. But all those outside the pale of the Romish Church can with equal right proclaim of their own creed what you proclaim of yours.
As to what you add of the common consent of myriads of men and the uninterrupted ecclesiastical succession, this is the very catch-word of the Pharisees. They with no less confidence than the devotees of Rome bring forward their myriad witnesses, who as pertinaciously as the Roman witnesses repeat what they have heard, as though it were their personal experience. Further, they carry back their line to Adam. They boast with equal arrogance, that their Church has continued to this day unmoved and unimpaired in spite of the hatred of Christians and heathen. They more than any other sect are supported by antiquity. They exclaim with one voice, that they have received their traditions from God himself, and that they alone preserve the word of God, both written and unwritten. That all heresies have issued from them, and that they have remained constant through thousands of years under no constraint of temporal dominion, but by the sole efficacy of their superstition, no one can deny. The miracles they tell of would tire a thousand tongues. But their chief boast is that they count a far greater number of martyrs than any other nation, a number which is daily increased by those who suffer with singular constancy for the faith they profess; nor is their boasting false. I myself knew among others of a certain Judah called the faithful, who in the midst of the flames, when he was already thought to be dead, lifted his voice to sing the hymn beginning, "To thee, o God, I offer up my soul", and so singing perished.

Quelle: Ethics