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John Searle

Geburtstag: 31. Juli 1932
Andere Namen: John Roger Searle

John Rogers Searle ist ein amerikanischer Philosoph. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete sind die Sprachphilosophie, die Philosophie des Geistes, Sozialontologie sowie Teile der Metaphysik. Searle ist Professor für Philosophie an der University of California, Berkeley.

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John Searle 1
US-amerikanischer Philosoph 1932
„Was auch immer genannt wird, muss vorhanden sein. Nennen wir es das Axiom der Existenz.“ Sprechakte: Ein sprachphilosophischer Essay. Aus dem Englischen von R. u. R. Wiggershaus. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971. S. ??

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American philosopher 1932
„There are five, and only five, possible types of speech acts, five types of illocutionary acts.4 These are (1) Assertives (statements, descriptions, assertions, etc.) whose point is to represent how things are and which therefore have the downhill or word-to-world direction of fit↓;(2) Directives (orders, commands, requests, etc.) whose point is to try to get other people to do things, and which have the uphill or world-to-word direction of fit↑;(3) Commissives (promises, vows, pledges, etc.) whose point is to commit the speaker to some course of action, and which, like directives, have the uphill or world-to-word direction of fit↑;(4) Expressives, (apologies, thanks, congratulations, etc.) whose point is to express the speaker’s feelings and attitudes about a state of affairs that is in most cases presupposed to exist already; and (5) Declarations, which, remarkably, have both directions of fit at once. In a Declaration we make something the case by declaring it to be the case. The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: corresponding to Assertives are beliefs↓, corresponding to Directives are desires↑, corresponding to Commissives are intentions↑, and corresponding to Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analogue for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language.5“ Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization

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