Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter II, Section 14, pg. 87-88
Kontext: Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce in injustice is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.
Kontext: We may reject the contention that the ordering of institutions is always defective because the distribution of natural talents and the contingencies of social circumstance are unjust, and this injustice must inevitably carry over to human arrangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce in injustice is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts. Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because they make these contingencies the ascriptive basis for belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes. The basic structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in nature. But there is no necessity for men to resign themselves to these contingencies. The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattern of human action. In justice as fairness men agree to avail themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common benefit. The two principles are a fair way of meeting the arbitrariness of fortune; and while no doubt imperfect in other ways, the institutions which satisfy these principles are just.
John Rawls: Zitate auf Englisch
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 1, pg. 3-4
Kontext: Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter VI, Section 59, pg. 388
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter II, Section 11, pg. 60
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 2, pg. 10
Kontext: The concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role.
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IX, Section 87, p. 586
Kontext: I have tried to set forth a theory that enables us to understand and to assess these feelings about the primacy of justice. Justice as fairness is the outcome: it articulates these opinions and supports their general tendency.
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 1, pg. 3-4
Kontext: Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
“We cannot at the end count them a second time because we do not like the result.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter III, Section 23, pg. 135
Kontext: The claims of existing social arrangements and of self interest have been duly allowed for. We cannot at the end count them a second time because we do not like the result.
“The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 3, pg. 12
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter III, Section 21, pg. 126
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter V, Section 42, p. 268
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IX, Section 82, p. 538
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter III, Section 28, pg. 171
“I have assumed throughout that the persons in the original position are rational.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter III, Section 25, pg. 142
“A just system must generate its own support.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter V, Section 41, p. 261
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IX, Section 82, p. 547
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IX, Section 84, p. 558
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 6, pg. 31
“In justice as fairness society is interpreted as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter II, Section 14, pg. 84
“Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 9, pg. 52
“Ideal legislators do not vote their interests.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter V, Section 43, p. 284
“Ideally a just constitution would be a just procedure arranged to insure a just outcome.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IV, Section 31, pg. 197
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 5, pg. 25
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IX, Section 86, p. 577
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter I, Section 3, pg. 15
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter III, Section 23, pg. 131
“The fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.”
Quelle: A Theory of Justice (1971; 1975; 1999), Chapter IV, Section 37, p. 230
