„Since it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning, our problem becomes this: To define the sense of a proposition in which a number-word occurs.“

Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas. Es wird also darauf ankommen, den Sinn eines Satzes zu erklären, in dem ein Zahlwort vorkommt.
Gottlob Frege (1950 [1884]). p. 73

Original

Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas. Es wird also darauf ankommen, den Sinn eines Satzes zu erklären, in dem ein Zahlwort vorkommt.

Übernommen aus Wikiquote. Letzte Aktualisierung 22. Mai 2020. Geschichte
Gottlob Frege Foto
Gottlob Frege5
deutscher Mathematiker, Logiker und Philosoph 1848 - 1925

Ähnliche Zitate

Witold Doroszewski Foto
William James Foto

„Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense for apprehending serial increase; and, unlike the several propositions themselves which make up the series“

—  William James American philosopher, psychologist, and pragmatist 1842 - 1910

Quelle: 1890s, The Principles of Psychology (1890), Ch. 28
Kontext: This world might be a world in which all things differed, and in which what properties there were were ultimate and had no farther predicates. In such a world there would be as many kinds as there were separate things. We could never subsume a new thing under an old kind; or if we could, no consequences would follow. Or, again, this might be a world in which innumerable things were of a kind, but in which no concrete thing remained of the same kind long, but all objects were in a flux. Here again, though we could subsume and infer, our logic would be of no practical use to us, for the subjects of our propositions would have changed whilst we were talking. In such worlds logical relations would obtain, and be known (doubtless) as they are now, but they would form a merely theoretic scheme and be of no use for the conduct of life. But our world is no such world. It is a very peculiar world, and plays right into logic's hands. Some of the things, at least, which it contains are of the same kind as other things; some of them remain always of the kind of which they once were; and some of the properties of them cohere indissolubly and are always found together. Which things these latter things are we learn by experience in the strict sense of the word, and the results of the experience are embodied in 'empirical propositions.' Whenever such a thing is met with by us now, our sagacity notes it to be of a certain kind; our learning immediately recalls that kind's kind, and then that kind's kind, and so on; so that a moment's thinking may make us aware that the thing is of a kind so remote that we could never have directly perceived the connection. The flight to this last kind over the heads of the intermediaries is the essential feature of the intellectual operation here. Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense for apprehending serial increase; and, unlike the several propositions themselves which make up the series (and which may all be empirical), it has nothing to do with the time- and space-order in which the things have been experienced.

„… I examined the concept, 'word sense'. It was not found to be sufficiently well-defined to be a workable basic unit of meaning.“

—  Adam Kilgarriff linguist from England 1960 - 2015

in I don't believe in word senses http://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/Publications/1997-K-CHum-believe.pdf (1997), p. 25

Raymond E. Feist Foto
Theodor W. Adorno Foto

„What is or is not the jargon is determined by whether the word is written in an intonation which places it transcendently in opposition to its own meaning; by whether the individual words are loaded at the expense of the sentence, its propositional force, and the thought content. In that sense the character of the jargon would be quite formal: it sees to it that what it wants is on the whole felt and accepted through its mere delivery, without regard to the content of the words used.“

—  Theodor W. Adorno German sociologist, philosopher and musicologist known for his critical theory of society 1903 - 1969

Was Jargon sei und was nicht, darüber entscheidet, ob das Wort in dem Tonfall geschrieben ist, in dem es sich als transzendent gegenüber der eigenen Bedeutung setzt; ob die einzelnen Worte aufgeladen werden auf Kosten von Satz, Urteil, Gedachtem. Demnach wäre der Charakter des Jargons überaus formal: er sorgt dafür, daß, was er möchte, in weitem Maß ohne Rücksicht auf den Inhalt der Worte gespürt und akzeptiert wird durch ihren Vortrag.
Quelle: Jargon der Eigentlichkeit [Jargon of Authenticity] (1964), p. 8

Rollo May Foto
Ludwig Wittgenstein Foto

„The problems are dissolved in the actual sense of the word — like a lump of sugar in water.“

—  Ludwig Wittgenstein Austrian-British philosopher 1889 - 1951

Quelle: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 183

James Thurber Foto

„A word to the wise is not sufficient if it doesn't make any sense.“

—  James Thurber American cartoonist, author, journalist, playwright 1894 - 1961

"The Weaver and the Worm", The New Yorker ( 11 August 1956 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1956/08/11/1956_08_11_019_TNY_CARDS_000252308); Further Fables for Our Time (1956)
From Fables for Our Time and Further Fables for Our Time

Bertrand Russell Foto
Matt Ridley Foto
Ludwig Wittgenstein Foto

„Philosophical problems can be compared to locks on safes, which can be opened by dialing a certain word or number, so that no force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and once it is hit upon any child can open it.“

—  Ludwig Wittgenstein Austrian-British philosopher 1889 - 1951

Conversation of 1930, in Personal Recollections (1981) by Rush Rhees, Ch. 6
Variante: Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open.
Quelle: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 175

Michel Bréal Foto

Ähnliche Themen